

# InCommon Certification Practices Statement for the InCommon IGTF Server Certification Authority

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Version 2.0

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

InCommon (“InCommon”) is an identity and trust community and services provider that offers optional subscription services for X.509 PKI certificates issued by an InCommon certification authority. Sectigo verifies the identity of each Subscriber and the Internet domains for which they are authoritative. InCommon outsources functions including protecting the CA private key, signing certificates, revoking certificates, publishing Certificate Revocation Lists (“CRLs”) and the operation of an Online Certificate Status Protocol (“OCSP”) responder to Sectigo Limited under the Intermediary CA Agreement (“Sectigo Agreement”) between Sectigo Limited (“Sectigo”) and University Corporation for Advanced Internet Development (d/b/a Internet2) and its single-member LLC, InCommon.

### 1.1. Overview

This InCommon Certification Practices Statement (CPS) outlines the legal, commercial, and technical principles and practices InCommon employs in managing the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3. This CA signs SSL/TLS certificates as a result of Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) approved by InCommon designated representatives (and their delegates) of research or educational institutions that are Subscribers to the InCommon Certificate Service. Certificates issued by the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 meet the requirements of the International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) Classic CA Profile.

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 intermediary CA certificate is signed by Sectigo’s USERTrust RSA CA, so the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 and CPS are required to comply with applicable Sectigo policies, practices, CPS and agreements. In the event of a conflict between this CPS and IGTF requirements and Sectigo CPS and agreements, InCommon will promptly notify both IGTF and Sectigo and work with all parties to resolve the conflict.

The CPS is formatted and maintained in accordance with IETF PKIX RFC 3647. To preserve the format of RFC 3647, some section headings do not apply and will contain the text “Not applicable” (“n/a”) or “No stipulation”. The RFC 3647 format is preserved to assist the reader in comparing and contrasting the various CPS documents provided by various CAs.

Sections of this CPS refer to services or practices provided by Sectigo under the Sectigo Agreement and in accord with provisions with the Sectigo UserTrust RSA CA “Certification Practice Statement” (<https://sectigo.com/cps-repository>). Such sections will contain the text “Provided by Sectigo as stated in the Sectigo CPS and binding upon the Subscriber.” The phrase “issued by InCommon” is to be interpreted as “issued by the Sectigo CA under the Sectigo Agreement.”

### 1.2. Document Name and Identification

This document is the InCommon IGTF Server CPS version 2.0, which was approved for publication on June 5<sup>th</sup> 2023 by InCommon's certification Policy Authority. There is no separate Certification Policy document; policy is incorporated within this document.

The object identifier (cpOID) for this CPS is identified in Appendix B and will be included in end-entity certificates issued by InCommon. The current version of the CPS is made available to the public through InCommon's repository as described in Section 2 below.

Each new version of this CP/CPS will result in assignment of a new cpOID to this document. Only significant changes that affect the trustworthiness of certificates require a new CP/CPS to be produced.

Revisions to this document have been made as follows:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Changes</b>	<b>Version</b>
August 2013	Initial version for IGTF Server CA.	1.0
November 2013	Reference CPS documents explicitly in Section 1.1.	1.1
May 2023	Update references from Comodo to Sectigo, update hierarchy	2.0

### **1.3. PKI Participants**

#### **1.3.1. Certification Authorities**

Certification authorities issue public key certificates to subscribers. A certification authority:

- Conforms its operations to this CPS as amended,
- Revokes certificates upon request by an authorized person,
- Maintains and updates its OCSP services on a regular basis,
- Publishes CRLs on a regular basis,
- Distributes issued certificates, and
- Notifies subscribers via email of expiring certificates that it has issued to them.

#### **1.3.2. Registration Authorities**

InCommon manages its own Registration Authority (RA). Each Subscriber organization also manages and operates a delegated RA – comprising its Subscriber Registrars and any Delegated Subscriber Registrars – that is responsible for activities under its own management control for its own organization.

#### **1.3.3. Subscribers**

Subscribers are research and education institutions, organizations, or other entities that use InCommon's PKI services to acquire certificates that support transactions and communications.

Subjects are identified in an issued certificate. The Requester controls the private key corresponding to the public key listed in an issued certificate.

Regardless of the Subject listed in the Certificate, the Subscriber always has the responsibility of ensuring that the Certificate is only used appropriately.

#### **1.3.4. Relying Parties**

Relying parties use InCommon's PKI service certificates to perform transactions, communications, or other functions at their own discretion.

Digital certificates do not guarantee that a certificate holder has good intentions or that the certificate holder will be an ethical business operation. It is the Relying Party's responsibility to independently examine each certificate holder to determine whether the certificate owner is ethical and trustworthy.

### **1.4. Certificate Usage**

A digital certificate is formatted data that cryptographically binds an identified Subject to a public key. A digital certificate allows an entity taking part in an electronic transaction to assert its identity to the other participants in such a transaction.

#### **1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses**

Depending on the certificate type, the certificates issued from an InCommon CA may be used for authentication, encryption, access control, and digital signature purposes.

## **1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses**

Certificates may only be used in accordance with their intended purpose and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations including export laws as described in the Subscriber Addendum. Certificates may not be used to complete or assist in performing any transaction that is prohibited by law. Digital certificates do not guarantee that a certificate holder has good intentions or that the certificate holder will be an ethical business operation.

Certificates may not be used for any application requiring fail-safe performance systems such as the operation of nuclear power facilities, air traffic control systems, weapon control systems, or any other system where a failure of the system could cause loss of life or property.

## **1.5. Policy Administration**

### **1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document**

This CPS is administered by the InCommon Policy Authority (PA). The InCommon PA is described in a document available in the InCommon CA repository as described in Section 2.

### **1.5.2. Contact Person**

InCommon:

InCommon Certificate Service  
c/o Internet2  
3520 Green Court, Suite 200  
Ann Arbor, MI 48105  
Email: [help@incommon.org](mailto:help@incommon.org)  
Phone: 1-734-913-4250

### **1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy**

There is no separate Certificate Policy document. The CPS combines both policy and practices.

### **1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures**

InCommon's CPS (and any amendments made to it) are reviewed and approved by InCommon's Policy Authority and approved by TAGPMA before signing any certificates under the new CP/CPS. Amendments to the CPS may be made by reviewing and updating the entire CPS or by publishing an addendum.

## **1.6. Definitions and Acronyms**

### **Acronyms:**

CA	Certification Authority
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request
MDC	Multiple Domain Certificate
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
RA	Registration Authority
SGC	Server Gated Cryptography
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer

TLS Transaction Layer Security

URL Uniform Resource Locator

X.509 The ITU-T standard for Certificates and their corresponding authentication framework

**Definitions:**

Applicant	The entity applying to become a Subscriber to the InCommon PKI services. May also be used to refer to an individual submitting a request for a certificate (see Requester below).
Certificate	A message that, at least, states a name or identifies the CA, identifies the Subject, contains the Subject's public key, and contains a serial number.
Delegated Subscriber Registrar	Any other individual to whom the Subscriber Registrar sub-delegates his or her permissions.
Master Registrar	Individuals within InCommon's Registration Authority who can delegate authority for certain Internet domains to up to 3 individuals within a Subscriber organization.
Registration Authority	The InCommon officer(s) who identify Subscriber Registrars for which Subscriber may issue CSRs.
Registrar	The generic term for an individual who may approve submittal of a CSR to the CA and has certain privileges to manage the certificate life cycle. Master Registrar, Subscriber Registrar and Delegated Subscriber Registrar are collectively Registrars and individually a Registrar.
Relying Party	An entity that relies upon the information contained within the Certificate.
Relying Party Agreement	An agreement that must be read and accepted by a Relying Party prior to validating, relying on or using a Certificate and is available for reference in the InCommon PKI repository as described in Section 2.
Requester	An individual who submits a CSR either via the User Interface (UI) or indirectly via the Application Programming Interface (API).
Subject	The entity that has been named in a Certificate.
Subscriber	An entity that has entered into an agreement with InCommon to make use of InCommon PKI services.
Subscriber Addendum	A legal addendum to the InCommon Participation Agreement that must be read and accepted by an Applicant before becoming a Subscriber. The Subscriber Addendum binds the Subscriber and all agents of the Subscriber that manage or acquire certificates from InCommon to its terms and conditions.
Subscriber Executive	The management officer at the Subscribing organization responsible for designating the organization's Subscriber Registrars. The Executive is authorized as such in the InCommon participation agreement or by succession and is typically be filled by a CIO, VP of IT, or other senior administrative officer responsible for the organization's information technology assets.

**Subscriber Registrar**

An individual that the Subscriber's executive contact identifies to InCommon and to whom InCommon provides credentials to allow approval of CSRs on behalf of Subscriber. A Subscriber Registrar may delegate his or her permissions to another individual whom the institution wishes to allow to approve certificate requests and manage certificate lifecycle generally.

**2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES**

This CPS is only one of a set of documents relevant to the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3. The list of documents below is a non-exhaustive list of other relevant documents. The document name, location of, and status, whether public or private, are detailed below.

<b>Document Status Location</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Location</b>
"InCommon Certification Practices Statement for the InCommon IGTF Server Certification Authority (This document)	Public	InCommon Repository
SSL Subscriber Agreement (i.e., "InCommon Certificate Service Subscription Addendum to the InCommon Federation Participation Agreement")	Public	InCommon Repository
InCommon Certificate Service Relying Party Agreement	Public	InCommon Repository
InCommon Certificate Service Policy Authority	Public	InCommon Repository

**2.1. Repositories**

InCommon publishes this CPS, related documents and certificates in its PKI services repository at <https://www.incommon.org/certificates/repository/>. The InCommon Operations group maintains the repository. InCommon makes reasonable efforts to ensure that the information in its repository is accurate, updated, and correct. However, in no event shall InCommon be liable for any amounts beyond the limits set forth in this CPS.

Parties accessing the repository agree to the terms posted in the repository in regard to its use of the documents and information on the repository. InCommon may revoke repository privileges for any party failing to comply with the terms on InCommon's website.

**2.2. Publication of Certification Information**

Certificate information is published in accordance with the provisions of the CPS relevant to such a certificate. Certificate content is published by issuing the certificate. Revoked certificate information is published in CRLs by InCommon's CA service provider and is available also by OCSP. Users and relying parties should consult the CRLs or OCSP server prior to relying on information featured in a certificate.

**2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication**

Updates to the CPS are published in accordance with Section 9.12. Updates to the Subscriber Agreement, Relying Party Agreements, and other agreements posted in the repository are published as often as necessary. Certificates are published upon issuance.

**2.4. Access Controls on Repositories**

The information published in the InCommon repository (refer to section 2.1) is public information and may be accessed and redistributed freely by anyone visiting the site, provided they agree to the site's terms and conditions as posted thereon. Read-only access to the information is unrestricted except as stated in section 2.1 above. InCommon has implemented logical and physical security measures to prevent unauthorized additions, modification, or deletions of repository entries.



### **3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION**

#### **3.1. Naming**

##### **3.1.1. Types of Names**

InCommon Certificates are issued with an X.501 compliant non-null Distinguished Name (DN) in the Issuer and Subject Fields. Issuer Distinguished Names will identify Internet2 (InCommon's parent organization) as the primary organization and InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 as the common name. Certificate Subject Distinguished Names will identify the Subscriber as the primary organization. The Subject will be in a name space owned by or under the administrative control of the Subscriber for which the TLS/SSL certificate will be used. Subject Alternate Name(s) must be included. Details of certificate profiles for TLS/SSL certificates may be found in the InCommon PKI repository as stated in Section 2.

InCommon certificates may include a brief statement describing limitations of liability, limitations in the value of transactions to be accomplished, validation period, and intended purpose of the certificate and any disclaimers of warranty that may apply. The lack of such information does not mean it does not apply to that certificate.

To communicate information InCommon may define:

- An InCommon standard resource qualifier to a certificate policy.
- Proprietary or other vendors' extensions.

##### **3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful**

InCommon uses non-ambiguous designations and commonly used semantics to identify both the Issuer of the Certificate and the Subject of the Certificate.

##### **3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers**

Does not apply to SSL/TLS certificates.

##### **3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various name Forms**

Distinguished Names in Certificates are X.501 compliant. For information on how X.501 Distinguished names are interpreted, please see RFC 2253 and RFC 8446.

##### **3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names**

The Distinguished Name in the Subject field of an InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 issued Certificate is unique for each named Subject. Also, the CA assigns certificate serial numbers that appear in issued certificates. Assigned serial numbers are unique across all certificates issued by the CA.

The Distinguished Name in the Subject field of each Certificate issued by InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 will contain a unique prefix of *"/DC=org/DC=incommon/C=Subscriber Country/ST=Subscriber State/O=Subscriber Name"* to avoid overlap with certificates issued by other CAs and other Subscribers. InCommon will assign a unique "Subscriber Name" to each subscriber during authentication of organization identity (see Section 3.2.2 and Section 4.2.1). InCommon will ensure through its internal procedures that a unique Subscriber Name once assigned is never re-assigned. An example Distinguished name is *"/DC=org/DC=incommon/C=US/ST=Michigan/O=Example University/CN=server.example.edu"*.

The Distinguished Name in the Issuer field of each Certificate issued by the InCommon IGTF Server CA will be *"/C=US/O=Internet2/CN=InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3"*.

Certificates must apply to unique resources/servers. Every subject distinguished name must be linked to one and only one end entity throughout the entire lifetime of the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3. Certificates must not be shared among multiple resources/servers, except in the case of certificates issued with a wildcard in the Subject CommonName.

### **3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks**

InCommon does not permit the use of a name or symbol that infringes upon the intellectual property rights of another as stated in its subscriber agreements. However, InCommon does not verify nor check the name appearing in a certificate for non-infringement. Subscribers are solely responsible for ensuring the legality of any information presented for use in an InCommon CA issued certificate. When submitting a CSR, InCommon subscribers represent that they are not interfering with or infringing upon the rights of any third parties.

InCommon does not arbitrate, mediate, or otherwise resolve any dispute concerning the ownership of any intellectual property or a domain's use of any infringing material. InCommon's CA may reject a CSR or revoke a certificate if it believes that any information in the certificate may be subject to infringement claims or ownership disputes.

### **3.2. Initial Identity Validation**

InCommon validates the identity of each new Subscriber and its officially designated officers, while the Certificate Manager validates domain names. For SSL/TLS certificates, InCommon validates only that the Subscriber has ownership of or administrative control for the Internet domain name(s) identified in its Subscriber Addendum or in later requests from Subscriber Registrars. Subsequently, subscriber Registrars are responsible to ensure the validity of any Subject information provided in a CSR. The InCommon CA will reject any CSR that includes a fully qualified domain name for which the Subscriber cannot be verified. All communications between the CA and RAs are conducted through a secure, authenticated web service that records all transactions. Subscribers are required to sign and comply with a certificate service agreement including identity validation processes. This agreement can be found in the "InCommon Certificate Service Subscription **Addendum to the InCommon Federation Participation Agreement**" (found in the document repository mentioned above).

#### **3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key**

Ownership of the private key is demonstrated through the submission of a valid CSR containing the matching public key.

#### **3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity**

InCommon may accept at its discretion any official organizational documentation supporting an application to become a Subscriber. InCommon may also use the services of a third party to validate and confirm information. Sources include:

- official organizational documentation, such as business licenses, articles of incorporation, sales license or other relevant documents.
- Third-party services or records such as bank statements, records of accreditation status, or other relevant documents.

Verification can occur through an automated process or a manual review.

InCommon also verifies the identity of Subscriber's designated officers – an official executive and Subscriber Registrars designated by the executive – using out-of-band means to verify contact information and to make contact with each officer for credentialing and Subscriber Registrar's subsequent authentication to the certificate management UI.

#### **3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity**

Section 3.2.2 describes the identity vetting of Subscriber Registrars.

#### **3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information**

InCommon verifies only the information listed as validated in section 4.2. Any other information provided by Subscriber Registrars is not verified by InCommon.

### **3.2.5. Validation of Authority**

The authority of a Subscriber to be issued a certificate is confirmed by a practical demonstration of the Subscriber Registrar's authority to act on behalf of the domain owner by means in accordance with acceptable practices as determined by the CA Browser Forum and specified at <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/>. Subscribers must notify InCommon if any Subscriber Registrar misrepresents his or her affiliation with or authority regarding Subscriber and Subscriber's domains.

### **3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation**

No stipulation.

## **3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests**

### **3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key**

Any Registrar or Requester can request a re-key by submitting an appropriate CSR.

### **3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key After Revocation**

Not applicable to InCommon SSL/TLS certificates.

## **3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request**

Prior to revoking a certificate, the InCommon CA verifies that the revocation was requested by the certificate Requester or an authorized Registrar associated with the Subscriber. InCommon may, if necessary, also request that the revocation request be made by the Subscriber's Executive contact. Upon receipt of an unconfirmed revocation request, the InCommon CA may request out-of-band confirmation from a known Subscriber Registrar or Executive.

# **4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

## **4.1. Certificate Application**

InCommon certificates are issued to authorized organizations and individuals who submit a certificate signing request and successfully complete the required validation procedures described herein. Prior to the issuance of a certificate, the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 will validate a request in accordance with this CPS. Validation of the request will involve the information provided by the Subscriber upon completion of their subscription contract and verified by InCommon prior to accepting the certificate request.

### **4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application**

SSL/TLS certificate requests may be submitted by an authorized Registrar or an authorized Subscriber Requester.

### **4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities**

InCommon operates the Registration Authority, leveraging its current processes for verifying organizations and identity proofing officials authorized to act on behalf of an institution for certificate issuance. It is expected that at each institution a small number of Subscriber Registrars (typically two or three) will be authorized to manage the overall institutional certificate program.

## **4.2. Certificate Application Processing**

### **4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions**

The InCommon Registration Authority validates the following required information in any SSL/TLS certificate. Other optional certificate subject information is considered under the purview of Subscriber Registrars and is detailed in the certificate profile found in the InCommon Repository.

- O (Organization): Legal Name of the Organization or a commonly understood and unique variant of Legal Name
- Common Name (CN): Fully Qualified Domain Name or publicly-routable organizational IP address

#### **4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications**

Subscriber Registrars are responsible for the approval of individual CSRs, the sub-domains represented in CSRs, and generally for the management of Subscriber certificates beyond the approvals of the Master Registrar stated in section 4.2.1.

#### **4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications**

Certificate applications are generally processed within one business day.

### **4.3. Certificate Issuance**

InCommon may refuse to issue a certificate to any party as InCommon sees fit. InCommon is not obligated to disclose the reasons for such a refusal.

#### **4.3.1. CA Actions During Certificate Issuance**

Upon approval of a certificate application, the CA signs an X.509 certificate containing the subscriber's public key and subject distinguished name.

#### **4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate**

Each subscribing organization manages the notifications for its members. The InCommon Certificate Manager supports customizable email notification capabilities.

### **4.4. Certificate Acceptance**

#### **4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

No stipulation.

#### **4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

#### **4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

No stipulation.

### **4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

#### **4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

Use of the Private Key in conjunction with a certificate issued by this CA is prohibited until the Subscriber has agreed to a Subscriber agreement. Certificates may only be used for lawful and appropriate purposes as set forth in this CPS. Subscribers are responsible for protecting their private keys from unauthorized use and agree to immediately cease using the private key in conjunction with a Certificate following the expiration or revocation of the Certificate.

#### **4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

The final decision concerning whether or not to rely on a verified digital signature is exclusively that of the relying party.

### **4.6. Certificate Renewal**

Renewal request requirements and procedures are treated as new certificate requests.

#### **4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal**

n/a.

**4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal**

n/a.

**4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests**

n/a.

**4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

n/a.

**4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate**

n/a.

**4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA**

n/a.

**4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to other Entities**

n/a.

**4.7. Certificate Re-key**

Certificate rekey is the issuance of a new certificate that certifies a new public key for the same Subject. Rekey request requirements and procedures are treated as new certificate requests.

**4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key**

n/a.

**4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key**

n/a.

**4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests**

n/a.

**4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

n/a.

**4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate**

n/a.

**4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA**

n/a.

**4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

n/a.

**4.8. Certificate Modification**

Certificate information may change during the life of the certificate. In this case, the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 will issue a new certificate based on the new information rather than modifying an existing certificate. Modification request requirements and procedures are treated as new certificate requests.

**4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification**

n/a.

**4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification**

n/a.

#### **4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests**

n/a.

#### **4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

n/a.

#### **4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate**

n/a.

#### **4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA**

n/a.

#### **4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

n/a.

### **4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

Upon revocation of a certificate, the operational period of that certificate is immediately considered terminated. The serial number of the revoked certificate will be placed within the CRL and OCSP server and will remain available in those locations until the end of the certificate's validity period.

InCommon does not make use of certificate suspension.

#### **4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation**

Revocation of a certificate is the permanent end of the operational period of the certificate prior to reaching the conclusion of its stated validity period. It is the Subscriber's responsibility to revoke any certificate whose private key becomes compromised or for any of the other conditions described in the Subscriber Addendum. A digital certificate may be revoked under any of the conditions described in the Subscriber Addendum.

#### **4.9.2. Who can Request Revocation**

The Subscriber, the Requester, or other appropriately authorized parties can request revocation of a certificate.

#### **4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request**

Certificates may be revoked by the Subscriber, end entity Requester or an appropriately authorized third party.

In case of emergency, revocation can be initiated via oral communication with the appropriate Subscriber Registrar or the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3.

Before revoking a certificate in an emergency situation, the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 shall authenticate the source of the request according to the same procedures used for the initial registration. The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 will always try to notify the certificate subscriber before revoking the certificate.

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 can revoke certificates without authentication upon proof of key compromise or violation of the CP/CPS rules and user obligations by the certificate holder.

#### **4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period**

There is no revocation grace period.

#### **4.9.5. Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request**

The processing time is dependent upon the Subscriber Registrar's ability to respond appropriately in his or her role as Subscriber's certificate lifecycle manager. The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 must react as soon as possible, but within one working day, to any revocation request received.

#### **4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties**

Relying Parties must always check the status of the Certificate on which they are relying. Relying Parties may check the OCSP and/or CRL to confirm that the certificate has not been revoked.

#### **4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency (if applicable)**

An updated CRL is published every 24 hours and remains valid for 7 days. Under special circumstances the CRL may be published more frequently. After any revocation a new CRL will be issued immediately.

#### **4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs (if applicable)**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.9. On-line Revocation and Status Checking Availability**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 manages and makes publicly available information about revoked certificates using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). All CRLs issued by the InCommon CA are X.509v2 CRLs as profiled in RFC5280. Users and relying parties are strongly urged to check the status of certificates at all times prior to relying on information featured in a certificate. The CRL and OCSP locations are specified in Section 7.

#### **4.9.10. On-line Revocation Checking Requirements**

Relying Parties must confirm the validity of a certificate via the CRL or OCSP mechanisms prior to relying on the Certificate.

#### **4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements available**

n/a.

#### **4.9.12. Special Requirements Re-key Compromise**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 does not utilize certificate suspension.

#### **4.9.14. Who can Request Suspension**

n/a.

#### **4.9.15. Procedure for Suspension Request**

n/a.

#### **4.9.16. Limits on Suspension Period**

n/a.

### **4.10. Certificate Status Services**

#### **4.10.1. Operational Characteristics**

Each CRL and the OCSP server contains information for all of the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3's revoked certificates until they expire.

All expired CRLs are archived.

Individual entries into the OCSP can be requested using the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 OCSP server. Revoked certificates are identified in the OCSP server immediately after their revocation.

#### **4.10.2. Service Availability**

The OCSP server provides access to certificate status information 24x7. CRLs are open to public inspection 24x7. This is non-inclusive of scheduled maintenance and SLA downtime allowances of 99.9% availability.

#### **4.10.3. Optional Features**

n/a.

#### **4.11. End of Subscription**

Withdrawal and termination are described in the Subscriber Addendum.

#### **4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 does not escrow Subscriber private keys.

### **5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS**

#### **5.1. Physical Controls**

##### **5.1.1. Site Location and Construction**

CA services operated under subcontract are housed in commercial co-location facilities.

##### **5.1.2. Physical Access**

Physical access to CA servers is restricted to appropriately authorized individuals. Card access systems are in place to control, monitor, and log access to CA facilities. CA servers are located in locked cabinets.

##### **5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning**

No stipulation.

##### **5.1.4. Water Exposures**

No stipulation.

##### **5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection**

No stipulation.

##### **5.1.6. Media Storage**

No stipulation.

##### **5.1.7. Waste Disposal**

No stipulation.

##### **5.1.8. Off-site Backup**

No stipulation.

#### **5.2. Procedural Controls**

##### **5.2.1. Trusted Roles**

Trusted roles for the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 are defined as the RA personnel who verify the Subscriber organization status and the identity proofing of Subscriber Registrars and the assignment of Subscriber Registrar credentials to the management interface.

Trusted roles for the physical operation of the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 and certificate request and revocation servers are managed under subcontract to meet or exceed WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria as detailed at <https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/audit-and-assurance/overview-of-webtrust-services/principles-and-criteria>.

##### **5.2.2. Number of Persons Required Per Task**

No stipulation.

##### **5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role**

No stipulation.



#### **5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties**

No stipulation.

### **5.3. Personnel Controls**

#### **5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements**

InCommon follows personnel and management practices that provide reasonable assurance of the trustworthiness and competence of their employees and of the satisfactory performance of their duties. All InCommon trusted personnel must have the necessary qualifications, experience, or training to fulfill their job descriptions. InCommon requires CA operators under subcontract to follow comparable personnel and management practices. The list of InCommon CA and RA personnel is maintained and verified at least once per year.

#### **5.3.2. Background Check Procedures**

Background checks are performed on all trusted InCommon personnel before access is granted to InCommon's systems. These checks include, but are not limited to, criminal history and employment history (for references). InCommon requires CA operators under subcontract to perform comparable background checks on subcontract personnel.

#### **5.3.3. Training Requirements**

Personnel training occurs via a mentoring process involving senior members of the team to which the employee is attached. The training program is periodically reviewed and enhanced as necessary.

Training programs are tailored toward each individual's job responsibilities and, as appropriate, may include training on PKI concepts, job responsibilities, operational policies and procedures, incident handling and reporting, and disaster recovery procedures.

#### **5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

Personnel are required to attend refresher training to ensure that they can competently and satisfactorily perform their job responsibilities.

#### **5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

No Stipulation

#### **5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

Personnel violating a policy or procedure are subject to disciplinary action. The action taken depends on the circumstances surrounding the action, the severity of the violation, and the personnel's past performance. In some cases, disciplinary action may include the personnel's termination of employment.

#### **5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements**

If an independent contractor or consultant is used, InCommon will first ensure that each such contractor or consultant is first obligated to abide by the same functional and security criteria that are set forth herein. Contractors and consultants are subject to the same sanctions as other personnel as set forth in Section 5.3.6.

#### **5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel**

No stipulation.

### **5.4. Audit Logging Procedures**

#### **5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 InCommon IGTF Server CA logs and archives the following items:

- Certificate requests
- Certificate issuance

- Certificate revocations
- Issued CRLs
- Attempted and successful accesses to CA systems and reboots of those systems

#### **5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 InCommon IGTF Server CA maintains its operational audit logs for at least three years.

#### **5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log**

Access to CA audit logs is restricted to CA operators, both Sectigo and InCommon staff assigned to the role of Master Registration Authority Officer (MRAO).

#### **5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.6. Audit Collection System (internal vs. external)**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments**

No stipulation.

### **5.5. Records archival**

#### **5.5.1. Types of records archived**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 archives all audit data (see Section 5.4.1).

#### **5.5.2. Retention period for archive**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 maintains archives for at least three years.

#### **5.5.3. Protection of archive**

No stipulation.

#### **5.5.4. Archive backup procedures**

No stipulation.

#### **5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records**

No stipulation.

#### **5.5.6. Archive collection system**

No stipulation.

#### **5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information**

No stipulation.

### **5.6. Key changeover**

Towards the end of each private key's lifetime, a new CA signing key pair is commissioned and all subsequently issued certificates are signed with the new private signing key. Both the old and new keys will be concurrently active until all end-entity certificates issued under the old key expire. The older but

still valid certificate will be available to verify old signatures and to sign CRLs until all the certificates signed using the associated private key have also expired.

The corresponding new CA public key certificate is provided to subscribers and relying parties through the delivery methods detailed in section 6.1 of this CPS.

## **5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery**

### **5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures**

No stipulation.

### **5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted**

No stipulation.

### **5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures**

Any private key compromise will result in revocation of the associated certificate(s) and issuance of an updated CRL as described in section 4.9.

### **5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster**

Provided by Sectigo as stated in the Sectigo CPS and binding upon the Subscriber.

## **5.8. CA or RA termination**

If the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 must cease operation, InCommon will make a commercially reasonable effort to notify all participants in advance of the effective date of the termination as described in the Subscriber Addendum.

## **6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.1. Key pair generation and installation**

#### **6.1.1. Key pair generation**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3's private keys are generated in a physically secured environment by personnel in trusted roles within cryptographic modules.

#### **6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber**

Not applicable.

#### **6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer**

Certificate requests are generated using Subscriber's software, and the request is submitted to the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3's approval workflow in the form of a PKCS #10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR).

#### **6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 public keys are published in the CA repository (section 2.2) and are provided to the International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) for inclusion in the IGTF Trust Anchor Distribution.

#### **6.1.5. Key sizes**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 and end entity keys use a 3072 bit RSA modulus.

#### **6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking**

No stipulation.

#### **6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)**

The key usage field extension in InCommon Certificates specifies the purpose for which the Certificate and key pair may be used. Enforcement of the limitations of use found in this field is beyond InCommon's control as correct use is highly dependent on having the correct software.

## **6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

### **6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 cryptographic key pairs are protected by cryptographic hardware security modules certified at FIPS 140 level 3 (or higher) and operated in FIPS 140 level 3 mode (or higher).

Sectigo ensures the protection of the AAA Certificate Services signing key pair and the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 signing key pairs in accordance with its AICPA/CICA WebTrust program compliant infrastructure and CPS. Details of Sectigo's WebTrust compliancy are available at its official website (<http://www.sectigo.com/>).

### **6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control**

For InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 key recovery purposes, the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 signing keys will be encrypted and stored within a secure environment. InCommon's escrowed copy of the private key is split across a number of removable media and requires a subset of the number to reconstruct. Custodians in the form of two or more InCommon authorized officers are required to physically retrieve the removable media from the distributed physically secure locations.

### **6.2.3. Private key escrow**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 does not escrow end-entity private keys.

### **6.2.4. Private key backup**

See Section 6.2.2.

### **6.2.5. Private key archival**

Not applicable.

### **6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module**

Where InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 signing keys are backed up to another cryptographic hardware security module, such keys are transferred between devices in encrypted format only.

### **6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 stores its private keys on cryptographic modules in non-exportable form.

### **6.2.8. Method of activating private key**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 activates private keys according to the procedures of the hardware security modules which are run in FIPS 140-2 Level 3 mode.

### **6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 deactivates private keys according to the procedures of the hardware security modules which are run in FIPS 140-2 Level 3 mode.

### **6.2.10. Method of destroying private key**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 operators can destroy the private key in the cryptographic module by reinitializing the device (i.e., restoring it to factory default settings) or using the operator interface to securely delete the key.

### **6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating**

See Section 6.2.1.

## **6.3. Other aspects of key pair management**

No stipulation.

### **6.3.1. Public key archival**

All issued certificates (which contain public keys) are archived for at least three years.

### **6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods**

The operational period of each Certificate generated ends upon its revocation or expiration. Certificates issued by the InCommon RSA IGTF CA 3 are valid for up to 13 months.. The InCommon RSA IGTF CA 3 certificate has a lifetime of 10 years.

## **6.4. Activation data**

### **6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation**

No stipulation.

### **6.4.2. Activation data protection**

No stipulation.

### **6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data**

No stipulation.

## **6.5. Computer security controls**

### **6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements**

InCommon computer systems are set up and maintained in a secure manner that prevents unauthorized access. The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 computers are provided by Sectigo as stated in the Sectigo CPS and binding upon the Subscriber.

### **6.5.2. Computer security rating**

No Stipulation.

## **6.6. Life cycle technical controls**

### **6.6.1. System development controls**

No stipulation.

### **6.6.2. Security management controls**

No stipulation.

### **6.6.3. Life cycle security controls**

No Stipulation.

## **6.7. Network security controls**

All InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 systems employ operating system firewalls allowing inbound connections only for required CA services. InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 systems are connected to highly protected networks that are actively monitored for intrusions.

## **6.8. Time-stamping**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 servers maintain accurate system clocks via trusted NTP servers or GPS devices.

## **7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES**

This CPS covers only InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 certificates.

InCommon may update or extend its list of products, including the types of certificates it issues, as it sees fit. The publication or updating of the list of InCommon products creates no claims by any third party. If necessary, InCommon will amend this CPS or create a separate CPS upon the inclusion of a new

certificate product in the InCommon hierarchy. The CPS will usually be made public on the official InCommon websites at least seven (7) days prior to the offering such new product.

Revoked certificates are appropriately referenced in the CRL and/or OCSP.

### **7.1. Certificate profile**

In order to use and rely on an InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 certificate, the relying party must use X.509v3 compliant software. Supported certificate profiles are listed in the InCommon Repository.

#### **7.1.1. Version number(s)**

The X.509 certificate version number is 2 indicating a Version 3 certificate.

#### **7.1.2. Certificate extensions**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 uses the standard X.509, version 3, to construct digital certificates for use within the InCommon PKI. X.509v3 allows a CA to add certain certificate extensions to the basic certificate structure. InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 uses a number of certificate extensions for the purposes intended by X.509v3 as per Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8, 1995.

The CA certificate contains the following extensions:

- X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE
- X509v3 Key Usage: critical Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
- X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
- X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
- X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:  
<http://crl.usertrust.com/USERTrustRSACertificationAuthority.crl>
- X509v3 Certificate Authority Information Access: OCSP: URI: <http://ocsp.usertrust.com>

End entity certificates contain the following extensions:

- X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE
- X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment, Digital Signature
- X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication
- X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.5923.1.4.3.4.2 Policy: 1.2.840.113612.5.2.2.1  
Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2
- X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI: <http://crl.sectigo.com/InCommonRSAIGTFServerCA3.crl>
- X509v3 Certificate Authority Information Access: OCSP: URI: <http://ocsp.sectigo.com>
- SubjectAltName: dnsName:FQDN

#### **7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers**

- Hash Functions: sha256 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1, sha512 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3
- RSA Encryption: rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
- Signature Algorithms: sha256WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11,  
sha512WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13

#### **7.1.4. Name forms**

See Section 3.1.5

#### **7.1.5. Name constraints**

All end entity subject distinguished names have the "/DC=org/DC=incommon" per Section 3.1.5.

#### **7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier**

A Certificate Policy (CP) is a statement of the issuer that corresponds to the prescribed usage of a digital certificate within an issuance context. A policy object identifier (OID) is a number unique within a specific domain that allows for the unambiguous identification of a policy, including a certificate policy or a certificate practices statement (CPS).

Specific InCommon certificate profiles are found in the InCommon Repository, and any relevant OIDs are provided in Appendix B.

#### **7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension**

No Stipulation

#### **7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 includes information in the Policy Qualifier field of the Certificate Policy extension that puts Relying Parties on notice as to the location of its CPS. This field usually includes a URL that points the Relying Party to the Relying Party Agreement, the CPS, and other documents in the repository where they can find out more about the limitations on liability and other terms and conditions governing the use of the Certificate.

#### **7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension**

No Stipulation.

#### **7.2. CRL profile**

CRLs comply with RFC 5280.

##### **7.2.1. Version number(s)**

The CRL version number is 1 indicating a Version 2 CRL.

##### **7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions**

No Stipulation.

#### **7.3. OCSP profile**

OCSP is a way for users to obtain information about the revocation status of an InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 issued Certificate. The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 uses OCSP to provide information about any of its revoked certificates that are unexpired. OCSP responders conform to RFC 8960.

##### **7.3.1. Version Number(s)**

No stipulation.

##### **7.3.2. OCSP Extensions**

No stipulation.

### **8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS**

The practices specified in this CPS have been designed to meet or exceed the requirements of generally accepted and developing industry standards, including the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, ANS X9.79:2001 PKI Practices and Policy Framework, and other industry standards related to the operation of CAs.

#### **8.1. Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment**

The InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 performs internal operational audits at least once per year to verify compliance with the rules and procedures specified in this document.

#### **8.2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessor**

No stipulation.

#### **8.3. Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity**

No stipulation.

#### **8.4. Topics Covered by Assessment**

No stipulation.

#### **8.5. Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency**

No stipulation.

#### **8.6. Communication of Results**

InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 audit result summaries are made available to TAGPMA upon request.

### **9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS**

While the structure of this CPS has been left intact as a matter of RFC form, the representations, warranties and limitations associated with this service are described in detail and governed by the provisions in the InCommon Participation Agreement and the Certificate Service Addendum.

#### **9.1. Fees**

##### **9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees**

Fees are detailed on the official InCommon website (<https://www.incommon.org/certificates/>). InCommon may change these fees pursuant to its rights under the Subscriber Addendum.

##### **9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees**

Currently, InCommon does not charge a fee for Certificate access but may in the future. Charges may be incurred for extensive or time-consuming searches. Fees for such extensive use are negotiated on an individual basis.

##### **9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees**

InCommon does not charge fees for the revocation of a certificate or for a Relying Party to check the validity status of an InCommon-issued certificate using its CRLs or OCSP.

##### **9.1.4. Fees for Other Services**

Fees for other services offered by InCommon are set either within the individual agreements with the parties or are detailed on the official InCommon website, depending on the services required.

##### **9.1.5. Refund Policy**

Subscriber refunds are described in the Subscriber Addendum.

#### **9.2. Financial Responsibility**

InCommon accepts no financial responsibility.

##### **9.2.1. Insurance Coverage**

Refer to the Subscriber Addendum and Relying Party Agreement.

##### **9.2.2. Other Assets**

InCommon accepts no financial responsibility.

##### **9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities**

InCommon provides no warranty as further described in the Subscriber Addendum and Relying Party Agreement.

#### **9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information**

InCommon observes the following rules on the protection of business information:



### **9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information**

InCommon keeps the following types of information confidential and maintains reasonable controls to prevent the exposure of such records to non-trusted personnel.

- Executed Subscriber agreements when not in violation with applicable state, federal, or other law (for example, state "sunshine" laws).
- Financial transaction records and financial audit records.
- External or internal audit trail records and reports.
- Certain portions of its contingency plans and disaster recovery plans.
- Internal tracking and records on the operations of the PKI infrastructure, certificate management and enrollment services and data.
- Subscriber Registrar email address and telephone if requested by Subscriber Registrar
- Proof of existence and organizational status of the Organization if marked Confidential by Subscriber

### **9.3.2. Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information**

Subscribers acknowledge that revocation data of all certificates issued by the InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3 is public information. Subscriber data marked as "Public" or submitted as part of a certificate request is not confidential and is published within an issued digital certificate in accordance with this CPS.

### **9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information**

All personnel in trusted positions handle all confidential information in strict confidence. InCommon is not required to and does not release any confidential information, unless otherwise required by law or by obtaining consent from the party to whom the confidential information belongs, without an authenticated, reasonably specific request by an authorized party specifying:

- The consent of the party to whom InCommon owes a duty to keep information confidential.
- The name of the party requesting such information.
- A court order, if any.

## **9.4. Privacy of Personal Information**

### **9.4.1. Privacy Plan**

InCommon has implemented a privacy policy, which complies with this CPS. The InCommon privacy policy is published in the InCommon repository described in section 2.

### **9.4.2. Information Treated as Private**

Any information about the designated officers of Subscriber organizations that is not publicly accessible or available through the content of the issued certificate, a CRL, or the OCSP is treated as private information. Subscriber organizations are responsible for the personal information of their delegated officers and constituents.

### **9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private**

Certificates, CRLs, the OCSP, and the information appearing in them are not considered private. Information about Subscribers available in public directories or databases is also not considered private.

### **9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information**

All InCommon personnel receiving private information are responsible for protecting such information from compromise and disclosure to third parties. Each party will use the same degree of care that it exercises with respect to its own information of like importance, but in no event will the degree of care be less than a reasonable degree of care.

#### **9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information**

Unless otherwise stated in this CPS, the applicable privacy policy, or by agreement, InCommon will use private information only for its own business purposes related to the services it provides to Subscriber and will not share that information with external parties except as required for by law or with the permission of the subject.

#### **9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process**

InCommon is entitled to disclose any confidential or private information, if InCommon believes, in good faith, that the disclosure is necessary in response to subpoenas and search warrants or if disclosure is necessary in response to a pending legal proceeding or a state's mandated sunshine laws.

#### **9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances**

No Stipulation.

### **9.5. Intellectual Property Rights**

InCommon or its partners or associates own all intellectual property rights associated with its databases, websites, InCommon digital certificates and any other publication originating from InCommon, including this CPS.

#### **9.5.1. Certificates**

Certificates are the property of InCommon. InCommon gives permission to reproduce and distribute certificates on a nonexclusive, royalty-free basis, provided that they are reproduced and distributed in full. InCommon reserves the right to revoke the certificate pursuant to revocation terms in the Subscriber Addendum. Private and public keys are the property of the subscriber's Subjects who rightfully generate and hold them.

Subscribers represent that their use of the certificate does not interfere with or infringe on any rights of third parties. The Subscriber represents that it is not seeking to use the issued certificate's domain and distinguished names for any unlawful purpose, including tortious interference with contract or prospective business advantage, unfair competition, injuring the reputation of another, and confusing or misleading a person, whether natural or incorporated.

#### **9.5.2. Copyright**

Copyright © 2010-2023 by Internet2. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice. Abstracting or creation of derivative works with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission.

#### **9.5.3. Trademarks**

See Subscriber Addendum.

#### **9.5.4. Infringement**

InCommon does not provide infringement resolution services. Subscribers are responsible for their own use of certificates. See the Subscriber Addendum for legal protections, rights and responsibilities.

### **9.6. Representations and Warranties**

Subscribers, Subjects, relying parties and any other parties must not interfere with or reverse engineer the technical implementation of InCommon PKI services, including, but not limited to, the key generation process, the public website, and the InCommon repositories except as explicitly permitted by this CPS or upon prior written approval of InCommon. Results of failure to comply with this as a subscriber is described in the Subscriber Addendum. Failure to comply with this as a Relying Party will result in the termination of the agreement with the Relying Party, the removal of permission to use or access the InCommon repository and any Digital Certificate or Service provided by InCommon.

All parties – subscribers, certificate subjects, relying parties, and any others – are solely responsible for having exercised independent judgment and employed adequate training in choosing security software, hardware, and encryption/digital signature algorithms, including their respective parameters, procedures, and techniques as well as in using PKI as a solution to their security requirements.

#### **9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties**

Other than the representations and warranties already detailed in this CPS, see Subscriber Addendum and InCommon Participation Agreement.

#### **9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties**

Other than the representations and warranties already detailed in this CPS, see Subscriber Addendum and InCommon Participation Agreement.

#### **9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties**

Other than the representations and warranties already detailed in this CPS, see Subscriber Addendum and InCommon Participation Agreement

#### **9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

See the Relying Party Agreement in the InCommon Repository.

#### **9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

No stipulation.

#### **9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties**

InCommon disclaims all warranties and obligations of any type, including any warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See the Subscriber Addendum and InCommon Participation Agreement (found in the InCommon Repository) for further information.

#### **9.8. Limitations of Liability**

See the Subscriber Addendum and InCommon Participation Agreement (found in the InCommon Repository) for further information.

#### **9.9. Indemnities**

##### **9.9.1. Subscriber Indemnity to InCommon**

Indemnification by Subscriber to InCommon, if any, is described in the InCommon Subscriber Addendum.

##### **9.9.2. Subscriber Indemnity to Relying Parties**

No stipulation.

#### **9.10. Term and Termination**

##### **9.10.1. Term**

This CPS and any amendments are effective seven days after being published to the Repository and remain effective until replaced with a newer version.

##### **9.10.2. Termination**

In case of termination of InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3operations for any reason whatsoever except in the case of force majeure, InCommon will provide timely notice and transfer of responsibilities to succeeding entities, maintenance of records, and remedies. Details are provided in the Subscriber Addendum, available in the repository.

##### **9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival**

Details are provided in the Subscriber Addendum, available in the repository.

## **9.11. Individual notices and Communications with Participants**

InCommon accepts notices related to this CPS by means of email messages or in paper form to the InCommon point of contact listed in section 1.5.2. For communication issues related to the performance of certificates or the designation of Subscriber Executives and Registrars, secure communication will be required, either through out-of-band means such as telephone, through authorized web-based transactions or email secured by digital signature.

## **9.12. Amendments**

The InCommon Policy Authority (PA) is also responsible for determining the suitability of proposed changes to the CPS prior to the publication of an amended edition. Amendments to this CPS may be made from time to time as approved by the InCommon PA. Amendments may be in the form of either an amended form of the CPS or made available as a supplemental document in InCommon's repository.

### **9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment**

Updates supersede any designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version of the CPS and are indicated through appropriate revision numbers and publication dates. Revisions that are not deemed significant by InCommon (those amendments or additions that have minimal or no impact on Subscribers or Relying Parties), are made without notice and without changing the version number of this CPS.

### **9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period**

Upon the PAs listed in Section 1.5.4 approving such changes deemed to have significant impact on the users of this CPS, an updated edition of the CPS will be published in the InCommon repository, with seven (7) days' notice given to Subscribers via email of upcoming changes. Suitable incremental version numbering will identify new editions.

### **9.12.3. Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed**

If InCommon decides that a material change in InCommon's certificate policy warrants a change in the currently specified OID for a particular certificate type, then the revised CPS or amendment thereto will contain a revised OID for that type of certificate.

## **9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions**

Before resorting to any dispute resolution mechanism including adjudication or any type of alternative dispute resolution, a party must notify InCommon of the dispute with a view to seek a resolution. Parties must work with InCommon in good faith to resolve issues in a reasonable manner prior to third party involvement.

## **9.14. Governing Law**

Details are provided in the InCommon Certificate Service Subscriber Addendum, available in the repository. This choice of law is made to provide uniform interpretation of this CPS, regardless of the place of residence or place of use of InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3's certificates.

## **9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law**

All parties agree to abide by all applicable laws when validating, issuing, or using certificates.

## **9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions**

### **9.16.1. Entire Agreement**

This CPS is not the entire agreement between any parties. All parties must accept additional agreements prior to receiving, using, or relying on a digital certificate. Section headings are for reference and convenience only and are not part of the interpretation of the CPS.

### **9.16.2. Assignment**

This CPS is binding upon all successors and representatives of any party. The rights in this CPS are assignable.

### **9.16.3. Severability**

Any provision held invalid or unenforceable will be reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make the provision valid and enforceable. If reformation is not possible, the provision is deemed omitted and the balance of the CPS remains valid and enforceable.

### **9.16.4. Enforcement**

InCommon's failure to enforce any provision of this CPS does not wave its right to enforce the same provision later or right to enforce any other provision of this CPS. To be effective, all waivers must be both in writing and signed by InCommon. Agreements between InCommon and various parties control in the event of a conflict between this CPS and the Subscriber Addendum.

Except where an express time frame is set forth in this CPS, any delay or omission by any party will not impair or be construed as a waiver of such right, remedy or power.

### **9.16.5. Force Majeure**

InCommon is not liable for a delay or failure to perform an obligation to the extent that the delay or failure is caused by an occurrence beyond the party's reasonable control. The operation of the Internet is beyond InCommon's reasonable control, and InCommon is not responsible for a delay or failure caused by an interruption or failure of telecommunication or digital transmission links, Internet slow-downs or failures, or other such transmission failure.

### **9.17. Other Provisions**

No Stipulation

### **Acknowledgments**

The InCommon Policy Authority acknowledges the considerable efforts of the research and education community in the development of this CPS.

**APPENDIX A**  
**PKI HIERARCHY**

AAA Certificate Services: USERTrust RSA Certification Authority: InCommon RSA IGTF Server CA 3:  
Subscriber Server Certificates

**APPENDIX B**  
**CERTIFICATE OBJECT IDENTIFIERS**

<b>CPS OID</b>	<b>1.3.6.1.4.1.5923.1.4.3.4.2.0</b>
<b>IGTF Classic Profile OID</b>	<b>1.2.840.113612.5.2.2.1</b>
<b>CABF Baseline Requirements OV</b>	<b>2.23.140.1.2.2</b>